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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4780 
COUNTY OF ROCKLAND, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, and ROCKLAND 
COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATOR'S ASSOCIATION, and ROCKLAND 
COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPUTIES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Interveners. 
THOMAS P. HALLEY, ESQ., for Petitioner 
PATRICIA ZUGIBE, COUNTY ATTORNEY (JEFFREY J. FORTUNATO of 
counsel), for Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (WILLIAM A. HERBERT of 
counsel), for Intervenor Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
F. HOLLIS GRIFFIN, JR., ESQ., for Intervenor Rockland County District 
Attorney's Criminal Investigator's Association 
RICHARD P. BUNYON, ESQ., for Intervenor Rockland County Sheriff's 
Deputies Association, Inc. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. (Federation) and cross-exceptions filed by the County of Rockland 
(County), the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO (CSEA)rand the Rockland County District Attorney's Criminal Investigator's-
Association (Association) to a decision of the Assistant Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Assistant Director).1 The Assistant Director granted the 
Federation's petition to be certified as the exclusive bargaining representative for a unit 
of Investigative Aides I, II and III (Narcotics) (Aides) employed in the County's District 
Attorney's Office as part of the Rockland County Drug Task Force (Task Force). The 
Aides are currently in a unit of County employees represented by CSEA. 
The Assistant Director found that the Aides, who work primarily as undercover 
narcotics agents for the Task Force, perform police functions and exercise police 
powers and, therefore, should not be included in an overall unit that does not include 
employees who perform law enforcement duties. Finding that the Aides were not 
covered by the interest arbitration provision of §209.4 of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act), the Assistant Director determined that the Aides were not 
appropriately placed in the unit of criminal investigators represented by the Association 
because criminal investigators employed in a district attorney's office are entitled to 
1The Rockland County Sheriffs Deputies Association, Inc. (Deputies 
Association) has not filed exceptions, cross-exceptions or a response to the other 
parties' exceptions and cross-exceptions. 
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interest arbitration. The Assistant Director also concluded that the Aides were not 
appropriately placed in the unit of patrol deputy sheriffs represented by the Deputies 
Association because of the minimal contact between the Aides and the patrol deputy 
sheriffs and the differing discipline procedures affecting the two groups of employees. 
He,4herefore, determined that a separate unit of Aideswas most appropriate. 
The Federation excepts only to so much of the Assistant Director's decision that 
does not find the Aides to be police officers entitled to interest arbitration. The County's 
cross-exceptions address only the Assistant Director's failure to find that the Aides are 
police officers within the meaning of Criminal Procedure Law, §1.20(34)(g) (CPL). 
CSEA's cross-exceptions argue that Aides are not police officers, are not otherwise 
entitled to interest arbitration and, because there are other titles in the CSEA unit that 
perform police functions, the Aides should not have been fragmented from the overall 
CSEA unit. The Association argues in its cross-exceptions that the Aides are not police 
officers, that the purposes of the Act are not served by a proliferation of bargaining units 
and that the petition should have been denied. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Assistant Director. 
The Aides perform criminal law enforcement duties as part of their assignment to 
the Task Force, where they work, for the most part, undercover. They make drug buys, 
and infiltrate drug rings and, to some degree, other organized crime networks. The 
Aides carry weapons and ammunition and are trained in firearms use; they must be re-
qualified each year. They are authorized to use deadly force when required. Their job 
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responsibilities include applying for and executing warrants, making arrests, wiretapping 
and collecting and maintaining custody of evidence. The Aides must have a high school 
or equivalent diploma, attend the municipal police academy, and qualify in firearms use. 
It is clear that the Aides perform law enforcement functions and have police 
powers. The Assistant Director found that theperformance of criminal law enforcement 
functions was enough to warrant fragmentation of the Aides from the overall CSEA unit. ; 
As a result, he did not make a specific determination that the Aides are police officers 
within the meaning of GPL §1.20(34)(g). 
Our decision in County of Erie and Sheriff of Erie County (hereinafter Cot/nfy of 
Erie),2 in which we created a unit of deputy sheriffs-criminal based upon their "providing 
ancillary services which are directly and predominantly related to criminal law 
enforcement," was the basis of the Assistant Director's decision. There, the petitioner 
urged us to use a test which focused solely on the status as "police officers" of the 
employees sought to be represented in a separate unit. We rejected that "bright line" 
test because it focused solely on title and not on job functions. Instead, we focused on 
the primary functions of the in-issue employees in making our determination that a unit 
of the deputy sheriffs-criminal was the most appropriate unit. 
As in County of Erie, here the exclusive or primary characteristic of the Aides' 
duties is to be "responsible for the prevention and detection of crime and the 
) 229 PERBU3031, at 3069 (1996). 
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enforcement of the general criminal laws of the state."3 Given these responsibilities, the 
Aides are most appropriately placed in a separate unit. That others in the unit 
represented by CSEA can and do engage in limited criminal law enforcement activities4 . 
from time to time does not provide a basis to deny fragmentation to the Aides, who are 
regularlyexposed to lawenforcement by virtue oftheir training and job responsibilities.5 : 
Based on the foregoing, the exceptions and cross-exceptions are denied and 
the decision of the Assistant Director is affirmed. 
For the reasons set forth above, we find the following unit to be most 
appropriate: 
3Civil Service Law, §58.3. This section of the CSL defines a "police officer", as 
one who, as "a member of...[any] other organization of a county... is responsible for the 
detection and prevention of crime and the enforcement of the general criminal laws of 
the state...." We need not decide, for the purposes of this decision, whether or not the / ; 
Aides are "police officers" within the meaning of the CSL or, as urged by the County, 
whether they are "police officers" within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure Law, 
§1.20(34)(g). 
4The Senior Medical investigators, who are in the CSEA unit, are deputized, are 
assigned weapons and receive weapons training, investigate homicides, suicides and 
any other suspicious deaths and have some limited interaction with personnel in the 
District Attorney's office. The probation officers and social services investigators also 
perform some related law enforcement tasks as part of their jobs. In an earlier case that 
sought the fragmentation of the criminal investigators from the overall unit, the Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) determined that these 
employees in the CSEA unit were not appropriately removed from the overall unit 
because, even though they occasionally performed police work, "their primary 
commitment is not to law enforcement even though, at times, they may work with, side 
by side, or under the temporary supervision of a police officer." County of Rockland, 16 
PERB 1J4005, at 4011 (1983). There is nothing in this record which warrants disturbing 
the Director's earlier determination. 
) 5County of Erie, supra, note 2. 
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Included: Investigative Aide I (Narcotics), Investigative Aide II 
(Narcotics), Investigative Aide III (Narcotics). 
Excluded: All other employees. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the case be remanded to the 
Director/Assistant Director for further processing consistent with this decision. 
DATED: December 20, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
4/JarcrA. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NOS. U-19029. 
U-19064&U-19145 
STATE OF NEW YORK (WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION BOARD), 
Respondent. 
NANCYE. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (TIMOTHY CONNICK of 
counsel), for Charging Party * 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MICHAEL VOLFORTE of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing three improper practice 
charges filed by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO (CSEA), alleging that the State of New York (Workers' Compensation Board) 
(State) violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally ended its practice of allowing employees an additional twenty minutes 
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beyond their normal lunch period to cash their bi-weekly paychecks without charging 
the time to leave accruals.1 
Initially, the Director held that because Article 39 of the parties' 1995-1999 
collective bargaining agreements2 was a reasonably arguable source of right to CSEA 
with respecttothe at-issue practice, thecharges should be conditionally-dismissed- l i -•.-. 
pursuant to PERB's existing deferral policies.3 CSEA filed exceptions to the Director's 
decision, arguing to us that the Director's conditional dismissal of the charges was 
unfair and a denial of its due process rights because the Director did not inform the 
parties that Article 39 was in issue. CSEA alleged that if it had known that Article 39 
was considered to be relevant by the Director, it would have offered into evidence'. 
arbitration awards holding.that Article 39 is not applicable to unilateral changes imextra-
contractual terms and conditions of employment. 
1Case No. U-19029 involves employees at the Albany office of the Workers' 
Compensation Board (WCB), Case No. U-19064 involves employees at WCB's Long 
Island office and Case No. U-19145 alleges the same violation at WCB's Buffalo office. 
The affected employees are in either the Operational Services bargaining unit or the 
Administrative Services bargaining unit, both of which are represented by CSEA. 
2Article 39 of the State-CSEA contracts provides: 
With respect to matters not covered by this Agreement, the State will not 
seek to diminish or impair during the term of this Agreement any benefit or 
privilege provided by law, rule or regulation for employees without prior 
notice to CSEA; and, when appropriate, without negotiations with CSEA; 
provided, however, that this Agreement shall be construed consistent with 
the free exercise of rights reserved to the State by the Management 
Rights Article of this Agreement. 
3See Town ofCarmel, 29 PERB P073 (1996). 
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Finding that the Director's inquiry at the hearing regarding the applicability of 
Article 39 was ambiguous and could have been reasonably misunderstood by CSEA, 
we remanded the cases to the Director for the receipt of any awards or decisions 
interpreting Article 39 which either CSEA or the State would offer and such other 
stipulations or evidence the Director considered relevant.4 -----—-
CSEA thereafter filed with the Director one arbitration award. It deals with the 
applicability of Article 39 to the probationary periods set forth in the Civil Service Law. 
The parties also submitted to the Director a Stipulation of Interpretation, wherein they 
agreed that the rights accorded by §209-a.1 of the Act are not employee benefits : 
provided by law, rule or regulation within the meaning of Article 39. Given the parties' 
stipulation, the Director determined that it would not effectuate the purposes of the Act 
to defer the charges and he decided the cases on the merits. 
The Director found that there had been a long-standing practice at WCB's 
Albany, Buffalo and Long Island locations of allowing employees an extra twenty 
minutes to cash paychecks without charge to leave accruals. On March 14, 1997, WCB 
issued a memorandum to all employees announcing that paychecks would thereafter 
be distributed after 3:00 p.m. on the Tuesdays prior to regularly scheduled Wednesday 
paydays. The memorandum went on to state: 
Supervisors and employees are reminded that the Attendance 
Rules do not provide for "release time" for employees to cash their 
paychecks. Employees who choose to be paid by check must 
conduct their personal banking outside of regular work hours. This 
means either before or after work hours, or during regularly 
432 PERB 1J3017 (1999). 
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scheduled lunch periods. If circumstances arise where an 
individual must conduct personal business during working hours, 
employees must request time off charged to leave accruals 
(personal, annual or holiday) in the usual manner. 
From the time the memorandum was issued, employees have not been allowed to cash 
paychecks without charging the time to leave accruals.5 
The Director reviewed in detail the applicable contracts between CSEA and the 
State and determined that the contracts comprehensively addressed workday, 
workweek, time and attendance and employee leave. By agreeing to those provisions, 
the Director found, the parties' had agreed that the subject matter of the charges, which 
he characterized as the use of leave accruals to conduct personal business, would be 
governed by their contracts. The Director determined that WCB's issuance of the 
March 14, 1997 memorandum represented a permissible reversion by WCB to the 
terms of the contract between the State and CSEA and he, therefore, dismissed the 
charges in their entirety. 
CSEA excepts to the Director's decision, arguing that the Director erred as a 
matter of fact and law in finding that the State was permitted to revert to the terms of 
the contracts with respect to the use of leave time for conducting personal business. 
The State supports the Director's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
5The practice was apparently reinstated at WCB's Long Island office after three 
pay periods. 
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There is no dispute that the contracts for the Administrative Services Unit and 
the Operational Services Unit do not contain any specific reference to leave for check-
cashing purposes. The contracts do cover a variety of leave provisions dealing with 
accrual, use, and notice of use of vacation, sick and personal leave, as well as a 
v-.nu-mber-of-other--types--of-1eaversuch-as-ieave.-for-mil.itary,and-ju.ry-duty,-..child-care--and-
leave to take examinations. CSEA argues that the reference in the contracts to "other 
types of leave" available pursuant to "law, rule or policy" reflects the parties' 
understanding that there are other types of leave not covered by the contracts available 
to CSEA unit members, including leave to cash paychecks. CSEA argues that, as the 
parties understood that the contracts were not all inclusive, the Director erred in finding 
that the State was privileged to end the nonconforming practice of check-cashing leave 
and to revert to the terms of the State-CSEA contracts. 
In Maine-Endwell Central School District,6 we held: 
[T]he employer's obligation, . . . is to refrain from unilaterally 
changing not a practice, but a term.and condition of employment. 
Where the contract is silent on a particular item, the past practice of 
the parties may be examined to determine the term and condition. 
(Footnote omitted) But when the parties have negotiated and 
reached an agreement on the item, the contract then defines the 
term and condition of employment, and actions taken pursuant 
thereto can no longer be labeled unilateral. In essence, the parties 
have, for the duration of the contract, waived their right to complain 
about such actions. 
; 
14 PERB U4625, at 4759 (1981), afTd, 15 PERB 1J3025 (1982). 
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Utilizing this standard, in Florida Union Free School District,7 we determined that 
even when the parties' contract is silent as to a specific term and condition of 
employment, where the parties have fully negotiated and reached agreement on a 
mandatory subject of negotiations which encompasses the specific term and condition 
in issuerthe employer cannot be said to have acted unilaterally when it reverts to t h e — 
terms of the negotiated agreement. Here; the practice in issue is taking time to cash 
pay checks or, in a broader sense, time for conducting personal business. The State-
CSEA contracts specifically set forth the terms the parties have agreed upon relating to 
the use of accrued leave for personal business. As our decision in County of Nassau8 
makes clear, each term and condition of employment need not be specifically set forth 
) in a collective bargaining agreement for us to conclude that the parties have negotiated 
to agreement on a general subject matter, which may be found to cover more specific 
practices which fall within the purview of that which has been negotiated. 
Like waiver by agreement, a contract reversion defense is also 
appropriately characterized as a duty satisfaction defense. An 
employer raising a contract reversion defense is claiming that it and 
the representative of its employees have already bargained and 
reached agreement on a subject. Having done so, the employer is 
privileged to act pursuant to that negotiated agreement, 
notwithstanding a practice to the contrary. The same argument 
forms the essence of a duty satisfaction defense. An employer, 
having bargained and reached an agreement with an employee 
organization as to how a subject is to be treated, cannot be held to 
have acted unilaterally in violation of the Act when it takes an 
action allowed by the agreement. Its duty to negotiate has been 
satisfied. Whether the defense is articulated as waiver by 
731 PERBfl 3056 (1998). 
831 PERB 113074(1998). 
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agreement or contract reversion, they are both differently phrased 
principles of duty satisfaction.9 
We find that the State was privileged to revert to the terms of its agreements with 
CSEA which support the State's position that time off from work for cashing pay checks 
is personal business which must be charged to personal leave accruals. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny CSEA's exceptions and affirm the decision of 
the Director. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charges must be, and they hereby are, 
dismissed. 
DATED: December 20, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Abbott, Member 
Johri T. Mitchell, Member 
9
 Id. at 3167. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RAMAPO POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19398 
TOWN OF RAMAPO, 
Respondent. 
SCHLACHTER & MAURO (REYNOLD A. MAURO of counsel), for Charging 
Party 
} ALAN M. SIMON, TOWN ATTORNEY (JACK SCHLOSS of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Ramapo Police Benevolent 
Association (PBA) to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision which dismissed its 
charge against the Town of Ramapo (Town). 
The PBA had filed a charge alleging violations of §209-a.1(a) and (c) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act), asserting among other things, that the 
Town, "in direct retaliation for his aggressive pursuit of his duties as PBA president," 
denied Brian Whitmore "his seniority right, including the right to select a sector" and, 
further, "denied Whitmore's request to serve on midnights in violation of an agreement 
) 
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reached in settlement of a prior improper practice charge" relating to sector 
assignments. 
The Town moved to dismiss the charge at the conclusion of the PBA's case and, 
thereafter, rested its case. After receipt and review of the transcript, the ALJ granted 
the Town's motion to dismiss. We agree. In County ofNassau (Rolice Department)^, 
we held that a motion to dismiss made to a hearing officer at the close of the charging 
party's evidence should not be granted without careful deliberation. Therefore, the 
hearing officer must assume the truth of all of the charging party's evidence and give 
the charging party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that could be drawn from 
those assumed facts. 
The PBA filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision. The PBA generally excepts to 
the factual determinations made by the ALJ and the conclusions drawn therefrom, 
although it provided no transcript references. 
In order to establish improper motivation under §209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act, a 
charging party must prove (a) he/she had been engaged in protected activities, and (b) 
that respondent had knowledge of and (c) acted because of those activities.2 If the 
charging party proves a prima facie case of improper motivation, the burden of 
117PERB1J3013(1994). 
2Town of Independence, 23 PERB ^3020 (1990). See also City of Salamanca, 
18 PERB TJ3012 (1985); City of Corning, 17 PERB fl3022 (1984); City of Albany, 4 
PERB H3056 (1971) Town of Newark Valley, 16 PERB |f4621 (1983), aff'd, 16 PERB 
P102 (1983). 
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persuasion shifts to the respondent to establish that its actions were motivated by 
legitimate business reasons.3 
We have held that the charging party can establish "[t]he existence of anti-union 
animus . . . by statements or by circumstantial evidence, which may be rebutted by 
presentation oflegitimate business reasons for the actions taken, unless found to be — 
pre-textual."4 Proof that the employer's stated reasons for its conduct are pretextual 
may constitute such circumstantial evidence.5 
Assuming the truth of the charging party's evidence and any reasonable 
inferences that could be drawn therefrom, we conclude that the PBAhas failed to prove 
the elements of the charge as set forth in our Salamanca decision and the charge must 
be dismissed. 
The testimony of Whitmore clearly indicates that he had engaged in protected 
union activities and the Town was aware of his union activities:6 
Q. Have you been precluded serving or since finishing your 
tenure as PBA president in engaging in any union activity of 
any kind? 
3City of Salamanca, supra; City of Albany, 3 PERB 1J4507, aff'd, 3 PERB fl3096 
(1970), conf'd in pertinent part, 36 A.D.2d 348, 4 PERB H7008 (3d Dep't 1971), aff'd, 29 
NY2d 433, 5 PERB TJ7000 (1972). See Mount Healthy City Bd. ofEduc. v. Doyle, 429 
U.S. 274 (1977);Captain's Endowment Ass'n (Mallory), 15 PERB fl3019 (1982). 
4See Town of Independence, supra. See also Convention Ctr. Operating Corp., 
29 PERB 1J3022 (1996); City of Rye, 28 PERB 1J3067 (1995), conf'd 234 A.D.2d 640, 29 
PERB 1J7021 (3d Dep't 1996). 
5See CityofUtica, 24 PERB 1f3044 (1991); Town of Henrietta, 28 PERB 1J4605, 
aff'd, 28 PERB 1J3079 (1995). 
6Transcript, p. 131. 
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A. By who? 
Q. By any superior officer or member of the town government. 
A. No. They wouldn't. . . they would have no control over that. 
Turning to the Town's reaction to Whitmore's protected union activity, the PBA 
alleged in its charge that the Town denied Whitmore's seniority right to select a sector 
and to work midnights. However, the evidence failed to support the PBA allegations. 
PBA President Lawrence Huxley testified that the Town had no contractual obligation to 
make sector assignments in any particular way.7 The PBA then called Chief Timothy 
Ruggiero as a witness, who confirmed that he directed his commanders not to make 
sector assignments based on seniority.8 Ruggiero further testified that Whitmore's 
assignment to sector seven had nothing to do with his PBA activities.9 Lastly, Whitmore 
was granted his request to work the midnight shift commencing January 1, 1998.10 The 
evidence presented by the PBA therefore fails to meet the "but for" test.11 
7Transcript, p. 59. 
8Transcript, p. 168. 
9Transcript, p. 171. 
10Transcript, p. 47. 
"County of Nassau v. PERB, 103 A.D.2d 274, 17 PERB 1J7016, (2d Dep't, 
1984); City of Albany v. PERB, 57 A.D.2d 374, 10 PERB 1f7012, (3d Dep't 1977). See 
also Rockville Centre Union Free Sen. Dist, 32 PERB 1J3050 (1999); City of New 
Rochelle, 27 PERB 1J3062 (1994); County of Nassau, 27 PERB fl3011 (1994), cont'd, 
221 A.D.2d 339, 28 PERB 1J7014 (2d Dep't 1995); Town of Independence, supra; City 
of Salamanca, supra. 
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We have long held that decisions of a public employer affecting its mission are 
not mandatory subjects of negotiation.12 Thus, officer Whitman's work assignment to 
sector seven was ultimately a management prerogative and his shift request was done 
in conformity with his union contract.13 
We hereby deny the PBA's-exceptions and affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: December 20, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/
 Marc A. Abbott, Member 
/ J&hn T. Mitchell, Member 
12See City of Albany, 7 PERB P078 (1974) (subsequent history omitted); City of 
Sch. Dist. Of the City of New Rochelle, 4 PERB H3060 (1971). 
13See testimony of PBA President Lawrence Huxley, transcript, p. 47. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BRIDGE AND TUNNEL OFFICERS BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
- and -
TRIBOROUGH BRIDGE AND TUNNEL AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
STUART SALLES, ESQ., for Charging Party 
CHRISTOPHER M. BEERMANN, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Bridge and Tunnel Officers 
Benevolent Association (Association) to a decision of the Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) on an improper practice charge filed by the Association. The Association alleges 
that the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority (Authority) violated §209-a.1(d) and (e) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused to continue the 
terms of the parties' expired collective bargaining agreement (CBA) by assigning unit 
members returning from "injury on duty" (IOD) leave to light or restricted duty and when 
it refused to bargain the impact of the assignment. 
The ALJ dismissed the improper practice charge in its entirety. 
The Association excepts to the ALJ's decision on substantive grounds, arguing 
that the ALJ erred as follows: 
CASE NO. U-19867 
Board - U-19867 -2 
1. The finding that the Authority did not refuse to continue the terms of the 
expired Collective Bargaining Agreement of the Association and the 
Authority, in violation of §209-a. 1 (e) of the Act. 
2. The finding that "light duty", as was unilaterally implemented by the 
---Authorityrwas not a mandatorysubject of-bargaining. 
On the basis of our review of the record and consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
As to the merits of the alleged violations of §209-a.1(d) and (e) of the Act, the 
record established that the language in the parties' CBA is silent on the subject of 
assigning disabled employees on IOD leave to iight duty.1 
Where, as here, a contract is silent on a particular subject, we have held that an 
employer's obligation is to refrain from unilaterally changing any noncontractual terms 
and conditions of employment. The past practice of the parties may be examined to 
determine the term and condition.2 The duty to negotiate in good faith includes an 
obligation to continue past practices that are mandatory subjects of negotiation.3 
1The Association raised the issue that the parties' contract was a source of right 
which required deferral of the charge. The ALJ found that the charge should not be 
deferred on either jurisdictional or substantive grounds. 
2See Maine-Endwell Cent. Sch. Dist, 14 PERB 1J4625 (1981), aff'd, 15 PERB 
1J3025 (1982). See also County of Livingston, 30 PERB 1J3046 (1997); Town of Greece, 
28 PERB H3078 (1995); State of New York-Unified Court Sys., 26 PERB 1J3013 (1993). 
3See County of Nassau, 13 PERB 1J3095 (1980), cont'd, 14 PERB 1J7017 (Sup. 
Ct. Nassau County. 1981), affd, 87 A.D. 2d 1006, 15 PERB fl7012 (2d Dep't 1982), 
motion for leave to appeal dismissed, 57 N.Y. 2d 601, 15 PERB 1J7015 (1982). 
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Here, the charge focused on the assignment of light duty to a Bridge and Tunnel 
Officer (BTO) on IOD leave4 and the Authority's failure or refusal to negotiate this issue. : 
The Authority argues that such assignment is a nonmandatory subject and, therefore, it 
is not obligated to negotiate the assignment of a BTO to light duty as a toll collector 
becausesuch assignment is an essential aspect otthe BTO's basic employment -•- - — -
function or of its related incidental tasks.5 We agree. The job description and typical 
tasks of a BTO show that collecting tolls is one of the essential functions of a BTO. It is 
significant that under Medical Standards in the Notice of Examination for the BTO, a 
candidate would be rejected by the Authority unless he or she could perform the job 
duties in.a reasonable manner. Article XIII 3(E) of the parties' GBA expressly states 
that "[i]n the case of extended absence for IOD or illness, the Authority's doctor and the 
employee's doctor will consult where the employee's doctor indicates that a directive to 
return to work is premature. The Authority's doctor's determination shall be f inal . . . . . " 
It is, therefore, apparent that an assignment to light duty as a toll collector is not outside 
of the essential functions of a BTO and a nonmandatory subject of negotiation.6 
4See Art. XIII of the parties'CBA. 
5See Town of Oyster Bay, 12 PERB 1J3086 (1979); Waverly Cent. Sch. Dist, 
10 PERB 1J3103 (1977). 
6See City of Schenectady, 25 PERB 1J3022 (1992), rev'd in part sub nom. 
Schenectady Police Benevolent Ass'n v. PERB, 25 PERB 1J7009 (Sup. Ct. Albany 
County 1992), modified in part, 196 A.D.2d 171, 27 PERB 1J7001 (3d Dep't 1994), 
) motion for reargument denied, 27 PERB TJ7007 (3d Dep't 1994), motion for leave to 
appeal granted, 83 N.Y.2d 760, 27 PERB 1J7015 (1994), affd, 85 N.Y.2d 480, 28 PERB 
H7005(1995). 
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Furthermore, such an assignment is based upon the judgment of the Authority's 
physician that the disabled BTO can perform the duties in a reasonable manner. 
Lastly, we agree with the ALJ's findings that the Association failed to adduce 
evidence that the Authority refused to negotiate in good faith the Association's impact 
demand.- Tha record established that tha Authorityon several-occasions offered to 
negotiate the impact of its decision to assign disabled employees to light duties. These 
offers were rejected by the Association.7. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the Association's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. ' 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
^ dismissed. 
DATED: December 20, 1999 
Albany, New York * ^ /^~~\ 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
J 7See City Sch. Dist. of the City of New Rochelle, 4 PERB fl3060 (1971). (PERB 
first articulated the employer's obligation to negotiate the impact of a decision involving 
a nonmandatory subject of negotiation.) 
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These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the Cayuga-Onondaga Board of 
Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) on improper practice charges filed individually by Cheryle Hoey, Brenda 
Bach and Elaine Waldschmidt (collectively, charging parties) alleging that the BOCES 
had violated §209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when the charging parties were terminated for engaging in protected activities. The 
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ALJ found that the charging parties1 were engaged in protected activity when they met • 
with their union representative to complain that a Special Education Teacher employed 
by BOCES2 had engaged in "bizarre and inappropriate conduct of a sexual nature" 
towards children under the teacher's supervision, that BOCES administrators knew that 
thexharging parties had soughthelp from.their union3 andJiad discussed their-, 
concerns with the CSEA representative, and that those administrators had terminated 
them for being insubordinate because they brought the allegations to the attention of 
their union representative rather than management. 
The ALJ found that BOCES acted with improper motivation because: (1) BOCES 
terminated the aides less than a month after learning they enlisted CSEA's help; (2) 
BOCES terminated the aides just a month after offering them reasonable assurance of 
continued employment and summer work; (3) BOCES gave pretextual reasons for 
terminating the aides and "revised" its reasons for firing them; (4) BOCES offered to •.;• 
allow Hoey to resign and to arrange employment for her in another school district after : 
finding that she failed to fulfill a moral and ethical obligation to protect the safety of a 
child. The ALJ concluded that C. Albert Sabin, BOCES' Director, objected to learning 
1The charging parties are employed by the BOCES as Special Education 
Teacher Aides (aides). 
2Forthe purposes of the hearing and decision in this matter the teacher was 
referred to as "Ellen Smith", a fictitious name. 
3The aides are in a unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). CSEA is not a party to these 
proceedings. 
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about the aides' concerns about Smith from their CSEA representative, and that but for 
the protected activity of going to their CSEA representative BOCES would not have 
terminated them. The ALJ ordered the BOCES to offer reinstatement with back pay to 
the charging parties. 
BOCES excepts to the finding of a violation on several grounds: the aides were 
not engaged in a protected activity; even if an activity is protected, an employer still 
may consider the employee's conduct during the activity, where the conduct has a 
bearing on the employee's ability to perform; the ALJ's finding that BOCES revised the 
reason for the terminations because it originally maintained that the aides failed to 
report their concerns, and allegedin its answer that they failed to "timely" report their 
concerns, is arbitrary and capricious; the mere proximity between the alleged protected 
activity and the terminations does not, in and of itself, give rise to a violation; the ALJ 
erred in basing a finding of pretext on the fact that BOCES had given aides "reasonable 
assurance" letters, which school districts provide only to escape liability for 
unemployment insurance during the summer months; the ALJ's decision found that the 
aides told BOCES administrators about the aides' concerns about Smith as they arose, 
but inconsistently also found that the aides did not realize until May 19, 1998 that 
Smith's behavior was so severe that it had to be addressed; in regard to aides' 
performance evaluations, the ALJ erred in finding that BOCES' reasons for the 
terminations were not, in her opinion, strong enough for termination; the ALJ found 
BOCES' reasons were pretextual despite the fact that before the aides met with their 
CSEA representative BOCES had threatened aides' jobs on several occasions and 
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Bach and Waldschmidt had received poor evaluations; the ALJ's finding that BOCES' 
reliance on Waldschmidt's negative evaluations was "bootstrapping" is not credible; the 
ALJ cited no evidence to support her finding that what Sabin objected to was learning 
about the aides' concerns from their CSEA representative; the ALJ cited no evidence to 
support herfinding that BOCES-terminated the aides because their allegations "were 
potentially, if not actually, embarrassing and economically injurious to BOCES"; and the 
ALJ improperly shifted the burden of proof.4 
The charging parties argue in response to the exceptions that the ALJ's decision 
should be sustained in all respects. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' . 
arguments, including those made at oral argument, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
For the 1997-1998 school year, the three aides were employed by BOCES at the 
Owasco Elementary School, part of the Auburn City School District, to assist Smith, a 
first year special education teacher, in a classroom with seven special education 
students in grades Pre-K, first and second.5 The record establishes that almost from the 
beginning of the school year, there were problems in Smith's classroom. Smith, the 
4BOCES also alleges in its exceptions that after the first day of hearing, the ALJ 
engaged in an improper ex parte meeting with the parties; after the hearing closed, the 
ALJ, over BOCES' objection, accepted in the record a letter from charging parties' 
attorney that stated the terms of a settlement offer BOCES had rejected; and that the 
conference ALJ's denial of BOCES' motion for particularization was prejudicial. We 
have reviewed the record as to these matters and find the allegations to be without 
merit. 
5For a more detailed recitation of the facts, see the ALJ's decision at 32 PERB 
114592(1999). 
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aides and other related professionals were to work as a team. By December 1997, at a 
team meeting, the aides were being counseled by Claire Colella, supervisor of BOCES' 
Special Education program, about their inability to work with Smith as a team.6 Hoey, 
received an excellent recommendation from Smith at this time and Waldschmidt's 
evaluation was positive. Despite the counseling received atthe December-.1997 
meeting, conditions in Smith's classroom continued to deteriorate throughout the spring 
of 1998. 
On April 1, 1998, Colella, Sabin and Pat Palmer, principal of Owasco, met with 
the aides to discuss reports of continuing classroom conflict. The meeting was a heated 
one, with Sabin telling the aides that they had to get their act together or he would 
separate or terminate them. Sabin told the aides that if they had any problems they 
were to go to Smith first, then.to Colella, Palmer or Sabin, himself, as a last resort. 
Colella reminded Waldschmidt about her bad evaluations. Thereafter, in May 1998, at a 
team meeting with Smith and the aides, the conflicts within the team were still apparent. 
At that meeting, Colella informed the aides that while Smith would have a job in the 
coming school year, their jobs were in question. 
6Bach was, in fact, advised that if she did not "clean it up", she would be fired. 
During the 1997-1998 school year, Bach received evaluations noting the need for 
improvement in certain areas. None of the aides, however, received poor evaluations 
or counseling in their dealings with the students with whom they worked. Waldschmidt 
had received evaluations in the 1996-1997 school year that reflected problems with her 
work. During the 1996-1997 school year, Bach was counseled for her argumentative 
demeanor. 
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All three aides testified that during the 1997-1998 school year, Smith had been 
engaged in bizarre or inappropriate behavior, ranging from yelling at the aides or 
students in front of other students, confiding her sexual fantasies and dreams to the 
aides, touching one of the aides (Waldschmidt), and verbally abusing a student in the 
Special Education class who had soiled-himself. At team meetings or in individual 
meetings with Colella, the aides told her about Smith's erratic behavior. Of most 
concern to the aides seemed to be Smith's behavior starting in early 1998 toward a 
young autistic girl in her Special Education class. Smith was toilet-training the girl and 
was observed on several occasions by Waldschmidt in a bathroom stall with the girl; 
apparently on at least one occasion in late March 1998, Waldschmidt thought that 
Smith was urinating in front of the girl. In April 1998, Smith directed Hoey and Bach to 
check the child's groin with their hands to see if she was wet. These incidents were hot 
related to Colella or Sabin. 
The aides talked among themselves after the May 1998 meeting with Colella. 
They shared the various situations in which they had been involved with Smith and their 
observations of Smith's behavior. Despite Sabin's instruction at the April 1 meeting that 
they follow the chain of command with any concerns or complaints they had about the 
team, the aides decided that they could not go to any of the individuals Sabin identified 
as supervisory personnel who would address their concerns. Instead, they decided to 
contact their CSEA representative. Bach made a call to CSEA in eariy June and aii 
three met with CSEA representatives, Kathy Morrell and Keith Barnes, on or about 
June 10,1998. At the meeting, the aides discussed their concerns about their 
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continued employment by the BOCES and related to Morrell and Barnes their 
observations about Smith. Barnes advised the aides that their concerns about Smith's 
conduct, especially the toilet-training of the autistic child, should be related immediately 
to supervisory staff at BOCES. Bach requested that Barnes not talk to anyone at 
BOCES until the end of4he school year. Barnes reiterated that BOCES should be 
informed immediately. It was agreed that he would do so; Barnes thereafter contacted 
Randy Ray, Esq., BOCES'legal representative. 
On June 5, 1998, BOCES issued letters of reasonable assurance of continued 
employment as aides for the 1998-1999 school year to the aides.7 On June 12, 1998, 
Ray met with Sabin, Colella and the BOCES' superintendent and related that Barnes 
had called him and reported that the aides had alleged that Smith had engaged in 
inappropriate sexual behavior with a child in her classroom and had made inappropriate 
sexual remarks to Waldschmidt. Sabin directed Ray to conduct an investigation. Smith 
was to be suspended with pay pending the completion of the investigation. On June 15, 
1998, each of the aides was called upon individually to answer questions as part of 
Ray's investigation. Morrell and Barnes were present for the interviews. The 
investigation concluded that week with a meeting of Ray, Colella, Sabin and the 
Superintendent, Dr. Frank Ambroisie, where it was decided that no one other than the 
7The letters of reasonable assurance of continued employment are issued in 
accordance with §590 of the Labor Law to preclude these employees from eligibility for 
unemployment insurance benefits during the summer months. 
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aides had observed allegedly inappropriate or illegal behavior by Smith. The 
investigation results and discipline of the aides were discussed. 
On June 18, 1998, Colella told the aides to gather their things and to leave 
school at noon the next day. At Sabin's request, Colella and Frederick Bragan, 
assistant director of BOCES, wrote letters dated July 8,-1998, to Ambroisie 
recommending the termination of all three aides for ignoring the instructions given to 
them at the April 1 meeting and for failing to report suspicions of possible child abuse to 
BOCES or Palmer. Additional grounds of inability to accept constructive criticism or 
team effectively with other classroom staff were given for Waldschmidt's termination 
and inability to follow directions or the supervision of the classroom teacher were the 
additional reasons given for Bach's recommended termination. 
The aides met individually with Colella at meetings held on July 8, 1998. Morrell 
and Barnes were also present. Hoey was given the opportunity to resign by Colella 
because she had an otherwise unblemished work history.8 Bach and Waldschmidt were 
advised that they were being fired. On July 16, 1998, the BOCES Board formally 
terminated the employment of Hoey, Bach and Waldschmidt. A letter of resignation 
from Smith was accepted by the BOCES Board at that time. 
It is well-settled that the elements necessary to prove a case of discrimination for 
union activity under the Act are that the affected individual was engaged in protected 
activity, that such activity was known to the person(s) making the adverse employment 
Hoey declined the offer to resign. 
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decision, and that the action would not have been taken but for the protected activity. 
The existence of anti-union animus may be established by statements or by 
circumstantial evidence, which may be rebutted by presentation of legitimate business 
reasons for the action taken, unless found to be pretextual.9 
At the close of the charging parties'case, BOCES made a motion to dismiss the -
charges on the grounds that the charging parties had failed to establish that they were 
engaged in a protected activity when they consulted with CSEA. The ALJ reserved on 
the motion and the BOCES put on its direct case.10 The ALJ denied the motion in her 
decision, determining that the aides were engaged in protected activity when they met 
with their CSEA representative about their concerns in fulfilling their job responsibilities 
and possible discipline and termination from their jobs. We agree.11 
The Act gives public employees the right to form, join or participate in an 
employee organization of their choosing and to be represented by that employee 
organization with respect to their terms and conditions of employment.12 The aides 
sought advice and representation from CSEA during their meeting with Morrell and 
Barnes. Certainly, consultation with a union representative about terms and conditions 
9Town of Independence, 23 PERB P020, at 3038 (1990). See also State of New 
York (Div. of Human Rights), 22 PERB 1J3036 (1989). 
10The only witness called by BOCES was Barnes, who appeared pursuant to 
subpoena. Colella and Sabin were called by the charging parties as part of their direct 
case. 
11
 See Binghamton City Sen. Dist, 22 PERB 1J3034 (1989). 
12Act, §202 and §203. 
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of employment falls within the Act's protection.13 As this was the only basis articulated 
by BOCES in support of its motion to dismiss, we find that the ALJ correctly denied the 
motion. 
It is undisputed that BOCES knew by June 12, 1998, that the charging parties 
had consulted-with GSEA.-The ALJ, therefore, correctlyfound that the BOCES had 
knowledge that the charging parties were engaged in protected activity. Having found 
that the aides had been engaged in protected activity and that the BOCES had 
knowledge of those activities, the ALJ then determined that the aides would not have 
been terminated "but for" their union involvement. We disagree with this conclusion of 
the ALJ. 
There was no evidence of overt anti-union animus adduced at the hearing. The 
ALJ reviewed the record and determined that the timing of the aides' termination was 
reasonably proximate to their meeting with CSEA, that the reasons given by BOCES for 
the termination varied, that the aides were offered reasonable assurances of continued 
employment for the 1998-1999 school year, that the aides properly reported their 
concerns about Smith and that the areas of concern in the prior performance 
evaluations of Bach and Waldschmidt had been resolved. Taken together, the ALJ 
concluded that Sabin had recommended the termination of the charging parties 
because of their exercise of protected rights. In reaching her conclusions, the ALJ 
found that the credible evidence supported her findings. She did not, however, credit 
; 
13See City of Newburgh, 11 PERB 1J3108 (1978), cont'd, 70 A.D. 2d 362, 12 
PERB 1|7020 (3d Dep't 1979). 
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the testimony of any witness over that of others, based upon her observations at the 
hearing or the demeanor of the witnesses. As there are no credibility resolutions upon 
which the ALJ relied, we find that the ALJ's decision is based upon her subjective 
evaluation of the evidence. Therefore, we need not defer to either the ALJ's factual or 
legal conclusions,1-
We find that the aides' terminations were based upon their failure to report an 
alleged instance of child sexual abuse to the proper authorities at BOCES or Owasco, 
and, in addition, as to Bach and Waldschmidt, their prior poor evaluations and their 
continuation in the 1997-1998 school year of the attitudes for which they received 
criticism in those prior evaluations. The record supports our finding that the aides were 
told directly by Sabin at the April 1 meeting that they were to work as a team and they 
were report any problems with Smith to Colella, Palmer or, finally, Sabin. A little over a 
month later, following another session with Colella where the aides were counseled 
about their ongoing problems in Smith's classroom, the aides decided that rather than 
go through the procedure outlined by Sabin, they would report their concerns about 
Smith's behavior with the autistic child to CSEA. 
Meanwhile, as early as May 1998, Sabin was considering the termination of 
Bach and Waldschmidt because of the failure of their team to work effectively in 
Smith's classroom and Bach's and Waldschmidt's ongoing job performance difficulties. 
uRockville Centre Union Free Sch. Dist, 32 PERB P050 (1999); State of New 
York (Unified Court Sys.), 24 PERB P048, conf'd, 186 A.D.2d 487, 25 PERB 1J7013 
(1st Dep't 1992). 
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In fact, one of the reasons the aides consulted with CSEA is that they felt their jobs 
were in jeopardy. 
BOCES then learned in mid-June 1998 that the aides had a concern about 
Smith and the toilet-training techniques she was using with the autistic child. As the 
allegations as reported by Barnes to Ray could be construed as allegations of child 
abuse of a sexual nature, an investigation was immediately ordered by Sabin. No 
independent evidence was found by Ray in his conduct of the investigation to support 
the allegations made by the aides. After the investigation concluded, Sabin determined 
that the aides had disregarded his directive, which had carried with it a threat of 
termination, and had not reported their concerns to Colella, Palmer or Sabin. 
We find that the record supports a conclusion that Sabin then recommended the 
termination of the aides for their failure to report a concern about the possible sexual 
abuse of a child in their care, for their failure to follow his April 1 directive and because 
their actions with respect to their concerns about Smith evidenced that at least Bach 
and Waldschmidt were still employees who were not able to effectively work as part of a 
team and that Hoey had become embroiled in the conflicts within the team. That slightly 
different reasons were referred to in the letters to the BOCES Superintendent and to 
the BOCES Board, in the meetings with the aides and in BOCES' pleadings in these 
cases is insufficient to warrant a conclusion that any of the reasons given were 
pretextual.15 The ultimate determination was that the aides had failed to follow a 
15See Rockville Centre Union Free Sch. Dist., supra. 
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directive by Sabin and had jeopardized the safety of a child under their care by failing to 
immediately report their concerns about Smith and the autistic child. 
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charges must be, and they hereby are, 
dismissed. - -
DATED: December 20, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
, /A 
Marc!^. Abbott, Member 
/lohh T. Mitchell, Member 
/ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LYLEHARTOG, 
Charging-Party, - -'-
- a n d - CASE NO. U-20555 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
LYLE HARTOG, pro se 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Lyle Hartog (charging party) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) did not Violate §209-a.2(a) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it deducted agency fees from 
his salary in an amount equal to full union dues without advance notice or financial 
disclosure. 
The ALJ dismissed the improper practice charge on her finding that CSEA 
segregates 100% of the nonmemberfees in a separate interest-bearing account until 
the period for filing objections and challenges has run, thereby providing CSEA with no 
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opportunity to make improper use of agency fee payer funds.1 In addition, the ALJ 
found that the lag time of three months before financial disclosure is provided to the 
agency fee objectors was not sufficiently egregious to establish a violation of the Act 
because the funds are segregated during this period. Lastly, the ALJ rejected charging 
party-s assertion that an advance reduction of nonmember fees-is required either under 
case law or the Act2, as long as the safeguards set forth in Chicago Teachers Union.v. 
Hudson (hereinafter Hudson)3 are met. 
The charging party filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision on substantive 
grounds, arguing that the ALJ erred as follows: 
(a) The ALJ found that the union did not violate the Taylor Law 
V and U.S. Constitution by deducting an agency fee without 
(i) notice and financial disclosure and (ii) an "advance 
reduction" in the amount of the agency fee deducted; and 
(b) The ALJ found that post-collection "escrow" remedies the alleged 
violations in light of the aforesaid lack of notice and advance reduction of 
agency fee; and 
(c) The ALJ found that a three-month delay in receiving the financial 
disclosure was lawful. 
132 PERB 1J4625, at 4931 (1999). 
2Act, §208.3(a). 
3475 U.S. 292, 19 PERB 1J7502(1986). 
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Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The Act authorizes a recognized or certified employee organization (here, 
CSEA) to have deducted from the wage or salary of the employees within its 
negotiating unit, who are-not members, the amount equivalent to the dues levied by the 
said employee organization. Since charging party is a State of New York employee, 
this deduction is made by the State Comptroller and thereafter transmitted to CSEA. 
The caveat in the Act is that the aforesaid deduction shall only be applicable to an 
employee organization which has established and maintained a procedure for refunding 
any part of an agency shop fee deduction to a nonmember which represents the 
employee's pro rata share of the organization's expenses in support of political or 
ideological activities or causes only incidentally related to terms and conditions of 
employment.4 This principle is not unconstitutional on its face.5 
This charge is not one of first impression for the Board. The Board's 
interpretation of §208.3(a) has established agency policy with respect to agency fee 
refund or rebate procedures.6 This Board has previously determined that at the time of 
4Act, §208(3)(a). This section was effective until October 1, 1999. By Chapter 
502 of the Laws of New York, 1999, enacted September 28, 1999, this section was 
extended for two additional years. 
5
 See Leemhuis v. New York State Public Employees Fed'n, AFL-CIO, 121 
A.D.2d 796, 19 PERB fl7512 (3d Dep't 1986), appeal dismissed, 68 N.Y:2d 910 
(1986). 
6See Public Employees Fed'n, 15 PERB 1J3024 (1982), cont'd, 93 A.D.2d 910, 16 
PERB U7016 (3d Dep't 1983). 
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making refunds to objectors who make application therefor, an itemized audited 
statement of the complete receipts and expenditures of a union or any of its affiliates 
who receive agency shop fee deductions, together with the basis for the determination 
of the amount of the refund, including identification of those items of expense 
determined to be refundable,must be furnished.7 In additionrthe failure to furnish full 
financial disclosure simultaneously with a refund check would be considered a violation 
of the Act.8 
In the instant proceeding, the parties stipulated to the facts. The salient portions 
of the stipulations, as they relate to our prior decisions, are as follows: 
(a) An agency fee equivalent.to the full amount of CSEA dues was deducted 
from the compensation of Mr. Hartog, a nonmember CSEA-unit employee 
by the public employer for whom he works, for the period 10/1/98 through 
12/30/98, and received by CSEA.9 
(b) Commencing October 1,1998, the full amount of all moneys deducted 
from the compensation of CSEA-unit employees, but non-CSEA 
members, and sent to CSEA by public employers, was placed in a 
separate CSEA-controlled interest-bearing account entitled "CSEA 
7
 See United Univ. Professions, Inc. (Barry), 13 PERB fl3090 (1980), cont'd, 86 
A.D.2d 734, 15 PERB 1J7001 (3d Dep't 1982), motion for leave to appeal denied, 56 
N.Y.2d 504, 15 PERB 1J7010 (1982). 
ald. 
9See p Stipulation dated April 27, 1999. 
Board - U-20555 -5 
Agency Shop Escrow Fund" . . . . hereinafter referred to as "Separate 
CSEA Account".10 
(c) CSEA then combined AFSCME's and its own expenditure information, 
had that information audited, and then printed twenty thousand copies of 
itsreport which it then addressed and-mailed toagency shop fee payers:11 
(d) That report entitled, "Agency Shop Notice," (copy attached) was mailed to 
agency shop fee payers on January 6, 1999.12 
(e) It provided for objections and challenges to be filed with CSEA by 
February 15, 1999.13 
(f) After February 15, 1999, the funds of non-objecting, non-challenging 
employees were transferred from the "separate CSEA account".14 
(g) CSEA held the agency fee deductions from non-members in a separate 
bank account beginning October 1, 1998 and did not use any of the 
challenger's money from that time through the time when objections and 
challenges could be filed.15 
10See 1J9 Stipulation dated April 27, 1999. 
11See 1J6 Stipulation dated April 27, 1999. 
12See fl7 Stipulation dated April 27, 1999. 
13See 1f8 Stipulation dated April 27, 1999. 
14See 1J11 Stipulation dated April 27, 1999 
15See 1f14 Stipulation dated April 27, 1999 
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(h) The funds withheld from objecting employees were withdrawn from the 
"separate CSEA account" during the week of April 5, 1999 and distributed 
to objecting employees and CSEA in proportion to the non-chargeable 
and chargeable expenditures, as reported to agency shop fee payers on 
— January-6, -1999,16 - -~ -_-._.- — 
(i) The funds withheld from challenging employees are retained in the 
"separate CSEA account"; CSEA intends that that account will not be 
liquidated until the resolution of the challenges, and it will then be 
distributed in accordance with such resolution.17 
It is apparent from the stipulated record that CSEA provided to charging party an 
itemized audited statement of its and AFSCME's expenditures in its notice mailed on 
January 6, 1999. It is also apparent from the stipulated record that CSEA has satisfied 
the constitutional procedures set forth in Hudson and its progeny by segregating 
agency fee funds completely so that there is no use by CSEA of the monies collected 
until the objection procedure is complete.18 CSEA has established an escrow account 
for the agency fees deducted from nonmembers, an independent audit of the charges 
16See 1J12 Stipulation dated April 27, 1999. 
17See 1J13 Stipulation dated April 27, 1999. 
18See Hudson, supra; Andrews v. Educ. Ass'n of Cheshire, 829 F.2d 335 (2d 
Circ. 1987). See also Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 17 PERB 1J7511 (1984); 
Abood v. Detroit Bd. ofEduc, 431 U.S. 209, 244 (1977), where the Court held that "the 
Union should not be permitted to exact a service fee from nonmembers without first 
establishing a procedure which will avoid the risk that their funds will be used, even 
temporarily, to finance ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining." 
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and a refund procedure. The ALJ found, and we concur, that a three-month span of 
time from the first deposit of agency shop fees into an interest-bearing escrow account 
until financial disclosure is not violative of the Act because the agency fee funds are 
segregated during this period.19 
Based on the foregoingvwe deny charging party's exceptions-and affirm the 
ALJ's decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge is dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: December 20, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/Z 
/TV / 
fm (Si Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
19See United Univ. Professions (Barry), 22 PERB 1J3003 (1989), where we held 
that a lapse of ten weeks between the date of an employee's filing of his objection to 
the union's agency-fee advance-reduction determination and the date of the hearing on 
that objection, was not excessive or unreasonable. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
YONKERS FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 860, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent CASE NO. D-0266 
upon the Charge of Violation of § 210.1 of 
the Civil Service Law. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 24 1999, Gary Johnson, this agency's Associate Counsel \ 
(Counsel), filed a charge alleging that the Yonkers Federation of Teachers, Local 860, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, had violated Civil Service Law (CSL) §210.1, in that it caused, 
instigated, encouraged or condoned a strike against the Yonkers City School District for 
four workdays from October 1 to October 6, 1999. The charge further alleged that of the 
approximately 2,100 employees in the negotiating unit, approximately 2,008 of those 
employees participated in the strike. 
After the Respondent answered the charge and a hearing was scheduled,: 
Counsel indicated to the Respondent the penalty he would be willing to recommend to 
this Board as appropriate for the violation charged. Counsel proposed a penalty of the 
loss of Respondent's right to have dues and agency shop fee deduction privileges for 
an indefinite period of time, but not less than eighteen (18) months, with other 
provisions as reflected in the order below. 
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Upon the understanding that Counsel would recommend and this Board would 
accept that penalty, the Respondent withdrew its answer to the charge, thus admitting 
the factual allegations of the charge. Counsel has so recommended. 
We find that the Yonkers Federation of Teachers violated CSL §210.1 in that it 
-engaged in a strike as charged, and we determine that the recommended penalty is a 
reasonable one and will effectuate the policies of the Act. 
WE ORDER that the deduction privileges for dues and agency shop fees, if any, 
of the Yonkers Federation of Teachers be suspended indefinitely, commencing on the 
first practicable date, provided that it may apply to the Board at any time after eighteen 
(18) months after the date of this order for the full restoration of such privileges. Such 
application shall be on notice to all interested parties and supported by proof of good 
faith compliance with subdivision one of Section 210 of the Civil Service Law after the 
violation herein found; such proof may include, for example, the successful negotiation, 
without a violation of said subdivision, of a contract covering employees in the unit 
affected by the violation, and shall be accompanied by an affirmation that the Yonkers 
Federation of Teachers no longer asserts the right to strike against any government, as 
required by the provisions of Civil Service Law §210.3(g). 
DATED: December 20, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
(JJohn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PROFESSIONAL AND SUPERVISORY 
ALLIANCE OF JAMESTOWN COMMUNITY 
COLLEGE, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4921 
JAMESTOWN COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Professional and Supervisory Alliance of 
Jamestown Community College has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: See attached list. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Professional and Supervisory Alliance of Jamestown 
Community College. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 20, 1999 
Albany, New York 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
Assistant Director of Buildings iuul Grounds - Jamestown 
Assistant Director of Duildinys and Grounds - Olean 
Assistant Director of Buildings and Grounds -Dunkirk 
Training Coordinator - Jamestown 
Training Coordinator - Dunkirk 
Training Coordinator - Olean 
Community Relations Coordinator 
Director of Campus Life 
Assistant Controller 
As s is la u I D i re c to r or Fin an cjaj Aid ,_, •-— '-- •—-
ETrTpioyme111 Development Specialist -P.T. 
Director, Community Cultural Center .-.-..• -S-\ 
Athletic Coordinator (I I nio.) 
•Health Center Director 
JCC Warren Center Director . 
Director, Sponsored Programs/Academic Planning - P.T. 
Director of Credit Free Programs 
Coordinator of Recruitment 
Coordinator of the Scharmanii 
Director of Business Services 
Children's Center Director - Jamesto 
Coordinator of Campus Life - P.T. 
Programmer/Analyst* ' 
Computer Training Coordinator -Olean • 
Computer Training Coordinator - Jamestown ' 
Computer Training Coordinator - Dunkirk 
Community Relations Assistant 
Bridge College to Work Director ' 
Director of Technical Hardware and Network Services 
lieatie - P.T 
own 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNION OF NEEDLETRADES, INDUSTRIAL AND 
TEXTILE EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4929 
TOWN OF PARMA, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile 
Employees, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4929 page 2 
Included: All full-time employees of the Town of Parma Highway Department. 
Excluded: All clerical employees, managerial and confidential employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees, 
AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession: 
DATED: December 20, 1999 
Albany, New York 
J*-r*Z*t-—=>. 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/lvTar<fA."Abrbott, Memfcer 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
